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Abstract 
 
Building on the revenue structure theory developed by Hettich and Winer (1984, 
1988, 1999), this paper is the first to investigate the economic and political 
determinants of local tax mix choices. We thereby use panel data on 289 
municipalities in the Flemish region of Belgium (period 1995-2002), where local 
governments enjoy extensive fiscal autonomy and have a wide choice of available tax 
instruments. Estimating a system of five reduced-form equations for the five central 
revenue sources (income, property, business, user fees and other own revenues), our 
results show that economics plays a significantly more important role than politics in 
shaping the local tax mix. Moreover, supporting theoretical predictions about 
marginal cost equalization across available tax instruments, absolute reliance on each 
revenue source increases as the overall revenue requirement gets larger (a ‘scale-
effect’). 
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1. Introduction 
The past 25 years have witnessed a major shift in the discourse on decentralisation, 
with the ‘economic’ discourse (i.e. motives of equity and efficiency) gaining 
increasing importance relative to ‘identity’ and ‘good governance’ arguments (for a 
detailed analysis, see Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). Using such discourse, 
decentralisation becomes increasingly “synonymous with allowing territories to adapt 
to changes in the economic environment” and becomes “the means to an end, a 
technical solution to the problem of economic organisation” (Rodriguez -Pose and 
Sandall, 2008, 58). This trend towards economic arguments to support further 
decentralisation efforts not only raises questions concerning the economics effects of 
further decentralisation (e.g., on income inequality; see Costa-Font, 2010), but also 
regarding the ‘optimal’ governance and finance structure of local governments. 
Indeed, “local governments which deliver a wide range of services need a mix of 
revenue sources that reflects the mix of services they provide” (Bird and Slack, 2007, 
738), requiring scholars to analyse in more details how such finance structure 
decisions are de facto taken at the local level.  
Yet, most empirical research on decentralized tax-setting policies to date is 
based on the single-equation econometric models aimed at identifying the 
determinants of “the” local tax rate, be it a property, income, business or consumption 
tax (see, e.g., reviews in Brueckner, 2003; Revelli, 2005). While some recent papers 
consider more than one tax instrument at once (Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998; 
Ashworth et al., 2006; Fiva and Rattsø, 2007; Van Parys and Verbeke, 2007), 
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systematic empirical analyses addressing the setting of the overall local tax mix are, 
to the best of our knowledge, unavailable to date.1
This lack of attention is surprising for various reasons. First, local governments 
around the globe can typically manoeuvre more than one revenue instrument, ranging 
from the choice between tax revenues and user fees (e.g., Bel and Miralles, 2010) to 
the decision to generate revenues from different tax bases (e.g., property versus 
income; with reference to the US case, see Nechyba, 1997; McGuire, 2001; Oates and 
Schwab, 2004). In addition, they can often influence more than one element of the tax 
skeleton: i.e., tax base, rate structure and special provisions. Moreover, understanding 
what factors drive local governments’ reliance on different tax sources is of key 
importance both for the implementation of an effective grant allocation mechanism 
(Inman, 1999; Bird and Smart, 2002) and the evaluation of the efficiency and equity 
consequences of currently ongoing decentralization processes (Goodspeed, 1994; see 
also above).  
 
Our paper bridges this gap by focusing on local tax setting decisions in Flanders 
and, building on the theory of revenue structures developed by Hettich and Winer 
(1984, 1988, 1999), aims at investigating the roles of economic and political forces in 
shaping the local tax mix (see also Bird and Zolt, 2008).2
                                                 
1  Explorations of the tax mix at the national level are likewise scant. Exceptions include Winer and 
Hettich (1991), Volkerink and De Haan (1999) and Kenny and Winer (2006). 
 The Flemish case is thereby 
of special interest for two reasons. First, Flemish municipalities have a very large 
number of available tax instruments, ranging from surcharges on federal personal 
income tax and regional property tax revenues to over 120 different purely local 
taxes, fees and user charges. Second, Flemish local governments are virtually free to 
2  The Hettich and Winer framework is more appropriate than, for example, a median voter model 
(e.g., Sjoquist, 1981) given that the institutional design of our empirical setting (i.e. Flanders) 
concerns a Parliamentary system with proportional representation and extensive coalition formation. 
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set tax rates and fee levels, as well as to define tax bases, for all purely local taxes. 
For the limited number of surcharge taxes, local governments can independently set 
the tax rate while the tax base is defined by the higher-level government setting the 
tax upon which the surcharge is levied (more institutional detail is provided in section 
3 below). Hence, local governments in Flanders enjoy both extensive fiscal autonomy 
and have a wide choice of available tax instruments. 
The empirical analysis based on a panel dataset on 289 Flemish municipalities 
observed along an eight-year time period (1995-2002) – and following the empirical 
approach employed by Kenny and Winer (2006) when analysing the tax structure in a 
large sample of countries – provides three main insights on the determinants of the 
local tax mix. First, state grants and local tax base sizes play a major role in 
determining the relative weight of tax instruments in local budgets, while 
governments’ political traits do not. This lends support to the hypothesis that the 
observed tax structure reflects the political costs of raising taxes, irrespective of 
government ideology and composition. Second, the empirical evidence presents 
strong support for Kenny and Winer’s (2006) ‘scale effect’ hypothesis; larger tax 
revenues are obtained from each tax source as the size of the public sector grows. 
Finally, there is no evidence of inter-municipal dependence in the determination of 
the local tax mix after controlling for the economic and political determinants of 
local tax setting. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
framework underlying our empirical analysis, while section 3 presents the 
institutional structure of local government in Flanders. Section 4 illustrates the 
empirical approach and the results from estimating a system of reduced-form tax 
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share equations. Section 5 verifies the scale effect hypothesis, section 6 tests for 
spatial dependence in local tax mix choices, and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
Our empirical investigation of the local tax mix is guided by the revenue structure 
theory developed by Hettich and Winer (1984, 1988, 1999). Hettich and Winer model 
taxation as part of a broader political equilibrium in which political parties compete 
for the support of a heterogeneous group of voters by choosing the tax structure that 
minimizes the political costs (in terms of electoral support) associated with the 
different tax sources exploited. The political costs of taxation derive both from 
voters’ loss in disposable income due to taxation as well as the welfare loss resulting 
from the costs incurred in avoiding or evading taxes. The basic set-up for the 
determination of the tax mix in a competitive political equilibrium is represented in 
Figure 1, where we consider a stylized balanced-budget two-tax case that can easily 
be extended to a multiple-tax environment. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The marginal cost curves for the two tax instruments (MC1 and MC2) reflect the 
government’s expected marginal vote loss from raising revenues from the two taxes 
respectively, taking into account the costs of administration, monitoring, enforcement 
and tax compliance.3
                                                 
3  The depiction in Figure 1 assumes that marginal political costs are independent across revenue 
sources (see Hettich and Winer, 1984, 70). While necessary to draw Figure 1, this assumption is 
relaxed in the empirical analysis below. 
 The marginal cost curves are upward-sloping, reflecting the idea 
that taxation becomes increasingly electorally costly when the size of revenue raised 
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increases.4
In the absence of grants from higher levels of governments, the government’s 
optimal budget size corresponds in equilibrium to the intersection of the MC curve 
and the curve representing the marginal benefit for the local community from public 
expenditures (MB). The MB curve is downward sloping to indicate that increasing 
amounts of government spending become progressively less desirable to the 
electorate, reflecting the conventional assumption of decreasing marginal utility from 
consumption of public services. At government size R0 = R1+R2, the marginal benefit 
of public spending funded by own tax revenues equals the marginal cost of raising 
revenues from each of the tax instruments, and the relative use of the two taxes 
depends on the position and slope of their respective MCi curves (i = 1, 2). 
 Summing the marginal cost curves horizontally leads to the overall 
marginal political cost of raising revenues MC. 
In the presence of grants (G in figure 1), the marginal benefit of local public 
spending funded by own sources of revenues shifts left-ward from MB to MB’ by the 
size of grants G; the local government sets the optimal level of own revenue at the 
intersection of the MC curve – representing the marginal cost of raising revenues 
from own tax bases – and the MB’ curve capturing the marginal benefit of spending 
own revenues on public services when receiving grants G. The resulting new 
equilibrium is characterized by a higher level of total spending (S0), a lower level of 
own tax revenues (R’0 < R0) and reduced reliance on both available tax instruments 
(R’1 < R1; R’2 < R2). The difference in slope of MC1 and MC2 implies that the relative 
reliance on the two taxes (i.e., the observed tax mix) might also change. 
                                                 
4  Each tax also has an underlying tax rate-revenue relationship (represented by the Laffer curve) that, 
for ease of exposition, is not drawn in Figure 1 (see Kenny and Winer, 2006).  
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In the more general case of K available tax instruments and a vector x of 
exogenous variables reflecting the position and shape of curves MCk (with: k = 
1,…,K) and MB, government’s optimization must lead to equalization of the 
marginal costs of raising revenues across all K tax bases. This results in a vector of 
optimal tax revenues to be drawn from each tax source as a function of all exogenous 
variables in the model: R*(x)=(R1*(x), R2*(x), ..., RK*(x)). 
The straightforward tax mix solution deriving from the above stylized 
framework can be employed to assess how exogenous changes in the socio-economic, 
demographic and political traits of a community affect the level and distribution of 
revenues across the available tax instruments. In particular, the model provides 
empirical predictions of a twofold nature.  
The first set of empirical predictions regards how the “relative” reliance on 
available tax instruments (i.e., the share of revenues from each tax instrument in total 
tax revenues) varies as circumstances change. Indeed, factors such as the sizes of the 
tax bases, as well as the administration and political costs of raising revenues 
determine equilibrium tax shares by affecting the position and slope of the marginal 
cost and benefit functions depicted in Figure 1 (see also Kenny and Winer, 2006). We 
explore such determinants in section 4. 
The second prediction concerns the absolute reliance on each available tax 
instrument as circumstances change, and is known as the “scale effect” (Kenny and 
Winer, 2006). In particular, the model suggests that all available tax instruments 
should generate higher (lower) revenues as the total size of the budget increases 
(decreases), holding everything else constant. That is, even though the relative 
reliance on every available revenue source will differ depending on the relative 
marginal costs of extracting more revenue from these various sources, the model 
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predicts that more revenues will be extracted from each source. This result follows 
directly from the need to equalise marginal costs of taxation across revenue sources 
and is illustrated in Figure 1 through the shift in the revenue requirement from R’0 to 
R0 (or the other way around). Such shift indeed leads to an increase (decrease) in 
revenues extracted from both taxes, with the extent of this additional reliance 
depending on the steepness of their respective MC-curves. We empirically evaluate 
the scale effect hypothesis in section 5. 
 
3. Local government and taxation in Flanders 
The local level of government in Flanders (and Belgium more generally) is organized 
according to a parliamentary system consisting of two main political bodies: the local 
council (the legislative body or ‘parliament’) and the College of Mayor and Alderman 
(the executive body or ‘government’). Council members are elected directly once 
every six years (and can be indefinitely re-elected) using a system of proportional 
representation. Following the election, the party (or parties in case a coalition is 
required) obtaining a majority of the seats in the council chooses which of its council-
members are appointed as alderman and mayor.5
                                                 
5  This is different from, for example, the Norwegian system where the composition of the College is a 
reflection of the composition of the council (cf. Tovmo, 2007). It implies, moreover, that, except in 
sporadic cases where mathematically superfluous parties are taken up in the ruling majority, all 
parties in the College are important to reach the necessary majority to pass legislation in the council. 
 As such, the College can be seen as 
that sub-section of the council concerned with the day-to-day running of the 
municipality (and is, like the council, headed by the mayor). Since all policy 
decisions, with few exceptions, are taken by majority vote in the council, political 
power clearly lies with those parties forming the majority government (note that 
minority governments hardly ever occur).  
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As in most West-European countries, Flemish municipalities assume significant 
responsibilities in public administration, education, local infrastructure, public safety, 
social services (e.g., welfare, housing, ...), environment (inclusing refuse collection) 
and cultural policies. While local governments have significant authority and 
autonomy in executing these tasks, the central (and regional) government defines the 
overall aims to be reached (placing Belgium in a “Southern-European”, Napoleonic 
tradition; see also John, 2001; Geys and Moesen, 2009). 
Revenues to finance these expenditures mostly derive from two main revenue 
sources. First, intergovernmental grants constitute on average about 40% of local 
revenues. They are a complicated, though objective function of population size, fiscal 
capacity, indicators of ‘need’ (i.e. share of elderly), size of green areas and whether or 
not the municipality is considered a ‘pole of attraction’ for labour and education. 
While some conditional grants are also employed, the majority of grant revenue is 
unconditional. Second, tax revenues constitute approximately 40% of revenues on 
average. These mostly derive from surcharge taxes on the regional tax on immovable 
property (i.e. the local property tax) and on the federal tax on labour income (i.e. the 
local income tax), though numerous purely local taxes are also employed (see below). 
The remaining 20% of revenues comes from a variety of revenue sources such as 
dividends from municipal cooperations (e.g., in distribution of gas and electricity) and 
returns on financial investments.6
Important for our analysis, Flemish municipalities nowadays have an extensive 
degree of autonomy with respect to their tax policy (see also Ashworth et al., 2006; 
Goeminne et al., 2008). For one, they have considerable liberty to introduce new 
 
                                                 
6 Note also that legal limits on borrowing, the absence of bailout possibilities and the direct supervision 
of the provincial and regional government, imply that Flemish municipalities face a relatively hard 
budget constraint. See Lago-Peñas (2005) for a review and discussion of the effects of soft budget 
constraints and bailout expectations on regional and local government. 
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taxes. In a sense, local governments are only stopped by their own imagination – and 
interventions by higher-level governments – regarding the taxes they introduce. For 
example, taxes on private swimming pools, balconies, transportation of drunken 
persons, distribution of telephone books, dogs, boats, horses and so on are levied by 
at least one Flemish municipality (while a tax on wearing masks only recently 
became obsolete). Approximately 120 different purely local taxes exist, for which 
municipalities can set the tax base as well as the tax rate independently and fully 
autonomously (see also Goeminne et al., 2008). Second, with respect to surcharges 
on higher-level governments’ taxes, local governments can set any tax rate they 
desire, although the tax base is determined by the higher-level government. 
Specifically, the primary tax base for the local income tax is individual taxpayers’ 
taxable income. From this, via application of the federal tax code, federal income tax 
revenue is calculated. This revenue forms the “secondary” tax base from which, by 
multiplication with the municipal tax rate, local income tax revenue is obtained.7
As a result of this considerable autonomy, there is wide diversity in the use of 
various tax sources. Clearly, not all municipalities use all available tax instruments. 
 For 
the local property tax, the same procedure applies, except that the underlying primary 
tax base equals the assessed net rental value of property. In 2002, the local income tax 
rate (i.e. the level of the surcharge) varied between 0% and 9.5% whereas the local 
property tax rate lay between 550% and 2250% (such that the bulk of property tax 
revenues goes to local governments). 
                                                 
7 Given that the exact nature of how local governments can tax non-resident commuters’ income as 
well as that of residents working in different communities has important effects on the use or non-
use of local income taxes (e.g., Nechyba, 1997; Strumpf, 2001; Spry, 2005; Hall, 2006), it is 
important to note that in Belgium the federal government restricts local governments’ ability to 
impose local income taxes to the incomes of residents. As actual  implementation of such residence-
based income taxes is strongly influenced by the extent of consumer mobility (i.e. fiscal competition 
for mobile residents; see Nechyba, 1997; Spry, 2005; Hall, 2006), we return more explicitly to 
spatial competitive forces in section 6 below. 
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Nonetheless, although on average approximately 80 percent of local tax revenues 
derives from surcharges on the federal income and the regional property tax, the 
average municipality levies no less than 17 different purely local taxes (out of the 120 
currently in use). This diversity is illustrated in more detail in Table 1, where we 
present summary statistics concerning the revenue shares of available tax instruments 
after having grouped these into five areas for reasons of tractability and interpretation: 
taxes on income (the municipal surcharge on the federal personal income tax), taxes 
on property (including the surcharge on the regional property tax and municipal 
property taxation), taxes on business (including taxes on employment of personnel, 
commercial signs and use of motorised equipment), user charges (including waste 
disposal and fees for use of public facilities) and other own revenues (such as 
administrative duties). These revenue shares are the main dependent variables in the 
later analysis.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 1 shows that income and property taxes are, on average, the most 
prominent revenue sources. Fees are the third-largest group, but, in contrast to many 
other Western countries, have lost some importance over the period analysed. For all 
five groups, significant variation exists as regards their prevalence across the Flemish 
municipalities (as evidenced by the sizeable standard errors). 
Finally, it is important to point out that municipal tax regulations have to be 
formally agreed upon by the local government every year while drafting the 
municipal budget. This formal agreement forms an important part of the revenue-
estimation process within the budgetary negotiations. All components of the tax 
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system – including tax rates and/or bases – can in principle be adjusted at that point. 
Most often, however, changes are restricted to tax rates. For example, with respect to 
the surcharge on income and property taxes, municipal tax rates are adjusted (usually 
upwards) very regularly – though not in all municipalities every year. Consequently, 
it is reasonable to assume that changes in tax revenues and shares reflect purposeful 
adjustments of the local tax mix (and not just economic developments). 
 
4. A reduced-form tax revenue share system 
4.1. Empirical model 
Following Kenny and Winer (2006), we estimate the system of equations (1), with the 
share of revenues from each tax source (ritk/rit) as the dependent variable, where ritk is 
total (real) revenues in jurisdiction i and year t from tax base k (k=income, property, 
business, user charges, and other), and rit=Σkritk: 
 
(ritk / rit) = xit′δk + fik + mtk + νitk      (1) 
 
The five revenue shares are regressed on a common vector of variables (xit) 
intended to capture the effects of grants, tax base sizes, socio-demographic 
characteristics of the locality and political and ideological traits of local governments 
on the position and slope of marginal cost and benefit functions. Since all equations 
include the same vector of exogenous variables, the system (1) can be estimated by 
ordinary least squares (OLS).8
                                                 
8 In fact, in such circumstances, OLS and GLS estimation of a system of seemingly unrelated 
regressions give identical results (Dwivedi and Srivastava, 1978). 
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For each tax share, fik and mtk represent jurisdiction-specific and time-specific 
fixed effects. The fik effects control for time-invariant unobservable characteristics of 
a locality that might affect their tax mix choices and be correlated with included 
regressors; such effects can include geographical location, number of neighbours 
(which might influence the degree of fiscal competition), composition of the property 
tax base9
First, xit includes central government grants as well as per capita income, per 
capita assessed net rental value of property, and the number of firms per inhabitant as 
measures of income, property and business tax revenue potential respectively. We 
should note here that one could argue that tax bases are endogenous because they are 
partly the result of fiscal policy. This, however, suggests a negative relation between 
tax base and reliance on that tax instrument (as high reliance on a tax would most 
likely lead to an exodus of the taxable base). As this goes against the prediction of the 
stylised theoretical model in section 2 – which suggests a positive relation in that a 
higher tax base lowers the associated tax instrument’s marginal cost function and 
increases the relative reliance on that instrument – any endogeneity concerns imply 
our estimates will provide a lower-bound of the true effect. 
 and distance from borders or large urban areas. The mtk effects capture 
common macroeconomic shocks as well as central government policies and electoral 
cycles. 
Second, a number of socio-demographic characteristics of the jurisdiction – 
population size and density, degree of income inequality (ratio of interquartile 
difference in income to the median value), rate of unemployment, and share of elderly 
(population over 65 as a percentage of total population) – are included to control for 
                                                 
9  Although the relative importance of residential and non-residential (i.e. mainly business) property 
can be an important factor affecting the relative reliance on property taxes (e.g., Blackley and 
DeBoer, 1987; Spry, 2005; Hall, 2006), the composition of the property tax base is likely to show 
considerable stability over time and its influence subsumed in our municipal fixed effects. 
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jurisdiction traits that are commonly expected to affect the political and 
administrative costs of raising revenues through different tax sources. 
Finally, four political variables are included. A measure of the government’s 
ideology evaluates whether parties’ political suasion – and the associated potential 
difference in perceived political costs of different types of taxes – affects the local tax 
mix. We measure the ideological complexion of the local government as 
∑=
n
i ii
Complexionp
1
).( , where pi is the seat share of party i in the College of Mayor 
and Aldermen and Complexioni refers to the party ideological position on a Left-
Right scale (from 0 to 10).10
                                                 
10  The data concerning a party’s ideological position were obtained from Deschouwer (1996) and 
Rihoux (2001). They are based on a self-placement survey asking presidents and spokesmen of the 
parties in the municipalities to locate their party on an ideological scale between 0 (Left) and 10 
(Right). The figures range from 2.6 (the Green party) to 6.1 (the Liberal party). 
 Second, we account for potential policy effects from the 
number of parties in the local government. This follows recent evidence showing that 
the size of local government coalitions significantly affects government decision-
making in Flemish municipalities (e.g., Ashworth et al., 2005, 2006; Geys, 2007; 
Goeminne et al., 2008; Werck et al., 2008). Third, an indicator of voter turnout – 
measured as the number of valid votes cast as a share of the total eligible population – 
is introduced to capture the degree of control of the electorate on governments’ 
choices (Borge et al., 2008). Finally, the share of women in the executive body of the 
municipality is included. This follows a number of recent studies indicating that 
gender is an important indicator of policy preferences (e.g., Lott and Kenny, 1999; 
Edlund and Pande, 2002; Funk and Gathmann, 2008) and that female representation 
often significantly affects policy outcomes (e.g., Pande, 2003; Chattopadhyay and 
Duflo, 2004; Svaleryd, 2009). All previous work on this issue, however, looks at the 
effect of female representation on the size of the public sector or the composition of 
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public spending. This is the first study assessing the role of female representation on 
the revenue side of the budget. Summary statistics of all variables are reported in 
table A1 in the Appendix.  
 
4.2. Results 
Table 2 reports the within-groups estimation results of the system of equations (1). 
Note that, given that we employ deviations from group means and that the five tax 
shares sum to one, the sum of the coefficients on each variable across the five tax 
instruments must equal zero. 
Starting with the effect of grants, we find that the share of revenues from 
income taxation rises as grants increase, while the shares of all other tax instruments 
fall accordingly. Since higher grants mean that a lower overall share of public 
spending needs to be funded by own revenues, this result suggests that the marginal 
cost function for income taxes is steeper than the marginal cost functions for the other 
tax instruments; most likely due to the progressive federal personal income tax 
imposing a high burden on income-earners. An alternative explanation is that 
extracting revenues from mobile tax bases (such as individuals’ income) may be more 
costly than relying on immobile revenue sources (e.g., property) in a competitive 
environment (Gordon, 1986; Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991; see Eggert and Haufler, 
1999, for a review). 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
In line with the stylised theoretical model in section 2, we also find that the 
share of the income tax rises with per capita income (a similar effect was observed in 
a cross-national sample by Bird and Zolt, 2008) and decreases with the property and 
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business tax bases. Moreover, the income tax share decreases with the rate of 
unemployment, the percentage of elderly residents and the degree of income 
inequality. The somewhat surprising income-inequality effect might be due to the 
limited redistributive impact of (proportional) local income taxation. 
As for the political variables, they have no significant direct effect on the share 
of income tax revenues, except for the proportion of females in the executive body. 
The latter significantly fosters reliance on income taxes, mainly at the expense of 
revenues from the residual source of revenue (mostly administrative duties). One 
potential explanation follows the argument that women tend to be more egalitarian 
and socially aware (cf. Lott and Kenny, 1999; Edlund and Pande, 2002; Funk and 
Gathmann, 2008). Hence, they are more likely to see the provision of administrative 
services as basic necessities which should be free (i.e. paid from general tax revenues 
raised through income and property taxes), while being in favour of a higher tax 
burden on high-income earners (and property owners; see below).11
The revenue share of the property tax is strongly positively affected by the 
property tax base and negatively by the income tax base. In addition, population 
density and the proportion of elderly exert a positive effect on the property tax 
revenue share, due to the fact that higher population density involves higher housing 
needs, and older people are more likely to be home-owners.
 
12
                                                 
11  An alternative explanation is that women get voted into office more often in municipalities that 
have a more ‘egalitarian-minded’ population overall. As such, it might be differences in popular 
preferences (rather than women’s policy preferences as such) causing both a higher share of 
female councillors and higher reliance on income and property taxes. 
 Similarly to income 
taxation, female representation is estimated to have a strong, direct positive effect on 
the relative use of property taxes. In addition, there is also a positive effect of 
government fragmentation, suggesting that more fragmented governments rely to a 
12  Unfortunately, no direct time-varying measure of home-ownership was available for the period 
under study. 
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larger extent on property taxation. A potential explanation here lies in the fact that 
government fragmentation is often associated with indecision and gridlock (Roubini 
and Sachs, 1989; Ashworth et al., 2005). In such a setting, it may be easier to agree 
upon taxing politically less costly (i.e., less mobile) tax bases. This interpretation is 
also consistent with the significant negative effect of the fragmentation index on the 
share of business taxation.  
Reliance on business-related tax revenues increases with the number of firms in 
the jurisdiction (while decreasing with the income and property tax bases), once again 
illustrating the importance of the tax base. Otherwise, the contribution of business tax 
revenues to a municipality’s budget appears most sensitive to political variables; it 
decreases with government fragmentation, voter turnout and female representation in 
the executive. 
User charges make up a larger share of tax revenues in larger municipalities 
(while decreasing with the income and property tax bases). Given that such charges 
are mostly flat taxes, this is suggestive of a tax base effect, i.e., larger municipalities 
have more residents potentially paying the user charge, thus providing an economic 
rationale for its usage. The explanatory power of the business taxes and user charges 
equations, though, remains limited. 
Finally, most of the included variables have little explanatory power in the rest 
category (including mainly administrative duties) equation, although there is evidence 
that left-wing governments and those that have a higher representation of women are 
less likely to get significant revenues from administrative duties. As mentioned 
above, left-wing parties and female politicians tend to have a more egalitarian attitude 
(Lott and Kenny, 1999; Edlund and Pande, 2002; Funk and Gathmann, 2008) and 
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therefore may want basic administrative services to be funded from general (income 
and/or property) tax revenues. 
Overall, the reduced-form system estimation results provide a somewhat 
unexpected picture of the factors affecting the local tax mix. In general, it appears that 
economic variables – such as the tax base sizes, that play a crucial role in determining 
the slope of the marginal cost functions13
Interestingly, the exception appears to be the share of female council-members. 
Such significant effect of female representation on the local tax mix supports previous 
work illustrating its effects on the composition of public spending (e.g., Pande, 2003; 
Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Svaleryd, 2009). 
, and grants, that proxy the overall need to 
raise own revenues to fund spending on local public services – are strikingly more 
important than political and ideological variables to explain variations in the local tax 
mix. The hegemony of economic factors in explaining the local tax mix is compatible 
with the prediction of Kenny and Winer’s (2006) theoretical model that the observed 
tax structure reflects the political costs of raising taxes, irrespective of the 
composition and ideology of government. 
 
5. Testing the scale effect hypothesis 
According to the scale effect hypothesis (Kenny and Winer, 2006), the equalization of 
the marginal costs of raising revenues across all tax sources in equilibrium implies 
that an exogenous shock to the budget requirement directly affects all available tax 
instruments. More specifically, all revenue sources should be exploited more 
extensively when more funds are required (though to differing degrees depending on 
                                                 
13 The tax base effects are also consistent with a benefit taxation model. Indeed, extension of a given 
tax base (e.g., the property tax base) might imply that more services are required by the associated 
socio-economic group (e.g., property owners), which, according to benefit taxation, should be 
financed via ‘their’ tax base (e.g., property taxes). 
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their marginal cost function), and vice versa. To test this hypothesis, we follow 
Kenny and Winer (2006) in estimating the system of equations (1) with real per capita 
revenues in jurisdiction i and year t from each tax base k (k=income, property, 
business, user charges, and other) as the dependent variables.14
 
 Since, as shown in 
figure 1, changes in grants have the effect of shifting the marginal benefit function, 
the estimated coefficients on grants capture the scale effect and are expected to be 
negative in all revenue equations. Being based on exogenous and infrequently 
adjusted spending needs and fiscal capacity indicators (see above), grants can be seen 
as exogenous from the municipality’s point of view and determine the overall size of 
required own revenues. Moreover, and crucially, given our fixed effects estimation 
strategy (as before, all variables are taken as deviations from the municipality means, 
thus leading to a standard within-groups estimator), they are uncorrelated with time-
varying shocks to individual revenue sources and are orthogonal to the marginal cost 
curves. The estimation results testing the scale effect are reported in Table 3. To save 
space, only the key grant coefficients are reported. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
The results indicate that grants have a negative and significant impact on all 
five sources of revenue. The total effect of an additional euro in grants is estimated to 
amount to around 0.19 euro of lower own tax revenues. This implies that an extra 
euro in grants raises spending by over 80 euro cents, suggesting the presence of a 
very strong ‘flypaper effect’ (see also Bastiaens et al., 2001; Heyndels, 2001). 
                                                 
14  Similar results are obtained when using revenues from each tax instrument as a proportion of 
income in the jurisdiction. 
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Nonetheless, the strength of the scale effect varies considerably across the available 
revenue sources. In particular, and consistently with the revenue share results 
discussed above, property tax revenues are estimated to respond to changes in the 
budget requirement in a relatively elastic way, with a coefficient of around -0.10. The 
response of income taxes, business taxes, user charges and other sources of revenue is 
substantially smaller (around -0.02). In light of the fact that income tax revenues 
account for almost half of total own revenues (table A1), the income tax appears to be 
stickier and harder to manoeuvre than all other tax instruments.  
Note, finally, that – viewing these results from a slightly different perspective 
– our findings also shed light on Flemish municipalities’ (dynamic) reactions to 
budget shocks; that is, they indicate to what extent, and how, municipalities replace 
lost grant revenue. Indeed, our results suggest that most lost grant revenue would not 
be replaced – but rather results in reduced spending (in line with evidence from the 
US, Germany and Spain, see Buettner and Wildasin, 2006; Buettner, 2007; Solé-Ollé 
and Sorribas-Navarro, 2009). Yet, and unlike previous studies, our results 
additionally indicate that revenues raised to (partially) replace lost grant income are 
disproportionately extracted from the property tax base. Hence, the replacement mix 
within Flemish municipal reactions to a budget shock appears heavily skewed 
towards immobile fiscal revenues. 
 
6. Inter-jurisdictional dependence 
A sizeable recent literature (reviewed in Brueckner, 2003; Revelli, 2005) suggests 
that local governments might use their tax instruments strategically, leading to inter-
municipal dependence in local tax-setting. As ignoring such spatial dependence might 
lead to biased inferences regarding the effects of exogenous variables on local tax 
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choices (Anselin, 1988), this section briefly evaluates the appropriateness of our non-
spatial approach in sections 4 and 5 by testing whether local tax mix choices are 
indeed made independently (rather than exhibit spatial auto-correlation).15
To get a preliminary picture of the extent to which spatial dependence is an 
issue in our setting, we first compute the Moran statistic of spatial auto-correlation on 
the raw tax shares from each tax source (sitk=ritk/rit). Letting ∆stk be the (289×1) vector 
of deviations from the mean tax share k in year t, the Moran statistic is computed as: 
 
 
Mtk(s) = (∆stk′ W∆stk)/(∆stk′ ∆stk)      (2) 
 
where W is a (289×289) weights matrix that contains information on the location of 
municipalities. In particular, we use the conventional binary, contiguity-based and 
row-standardised matrix, meaning that the (i,j) element of W equals 1/ni if 
municipalities i and j share a border, with ni the number of bordering municipalities 
of municipality i, and 0 otherwise.16 The Moran statistic is asymptotically normally 
distributed (Anselin, 1988). Table 4 reports both the values taken by the Moran 
statistic in each of the eight years and the one based on the eight-year average.17
 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
                                                 
15 Previous work suggests significant spatial auto-correlation in the setting of local income and 
property tax rates in Flanders (e.g., Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998; Richard et al., 2005; Van Parys 
and Verbeke, 2007; Gérard et al., 2010). Geys (2006) provides evidence of spatial auto-correlation 
in Flemish local government efficiency ratings (see Revelli and Tovmo, 2007, for a similar finding 
using Norwegian data). 
16 The results are qualitatively similar when employing distance-based matrices (details available upon 
request). 
17 Similar results are obtained when computing the Moran statistic on per capita tax revenues. 
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The results in Table 4 show that all tax shares, except for “other” sources of 
revenue, are highly positively correlated across space. Still, these results cannot be 
directly interpreted as evidence in favour of inter-jurisdictional dependence. In fact, 
the inter-municipal correlation observed in Table 4 may simply result from failing to 
control for socio-economic similarities between neighbouring municipalities. Indeed, 
since contiguous municipalities share common socio-economic structures, these may 
influence their tax mix choices in the same direction. Hence, we compute the Moran 
statistic on the residuals from the system of reduced-form share equations (1) (see 
also Egger et al., 2009): 
 
Mtk(ν) = (νtk′ Wνtk)/(νtk′ νtk)       (3) 
 
The results are reported in Table 5, again for each of the eight years separately 
and for the eight-year average. In sharp contrast to the results in Table 4, the residuals 
from system (1) reveal virtually no evidence of spatial dependence. Only five cells in 
Table 5 are statistically significant at the 5% level (two in 1995 and three in 1996), 
suggesting that the inter-municipal correlation observed in Table 4 plausibly derives 
from the fact that contiguous municipalities share common socio-economic structures 
influencing their tax mix choices in the same direction. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Of course, the similarity in the socio-economic environment of nearby localities 
might itself be the outcome of inter-governmental competition for tax bases, leading 
to agglomeration of economic activities as well as stratification of population based 
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on income and tastes. However, an evaluation of the extent to which municipal 
governments’ policies could actually be responsible for such long-run localization 
processes reasonably seems to go beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper has offered the first comprehensive investigation of the determinants of 
the local tax mix in the presence of multiple tax instruments using panel data on 289 
Flemish municipalities over the period 1995-2002. Our analysis points to the 
predominance of economic over political factors in the determination of the observed 
tax mix. Indeed, the most powerful drivers of the local tax mix turn out to be the sizes 
of the respective tax bases as well as central government grants. Other socio-
economic characteristics of the municipality – such as demographic composition, 
income distribution or population density – likewise influence the tax mix in a 
significant way, lending support to the prediction emerging from the theoretical 
model that the observed tax structure reflects the political costs of raising taxes. On 
the other hand, political variables capturing the strength, ideology and composition of 
the local executive turn out to play a negligible direct role in the determination of the 
local tax mix. Interestingly, however, and in line with recent research, we find that the 
share of female council-members significantly affects the chosen tax mix in a more 
redistributive direction. 
Second, the evidence presented firmly supports the Kenny and Winer (2006) 
scale effect hypothesis. That is, all available tax instruments generate higher (lower) 
revenues as the budget requirement increases (decreases) exogenously. The strength 
of this effect varies considerably across the available revenue sources, with property 
tax revenues reacting in a significantly more elastic way than income tax revenues to 
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exogenous changes in the budget requirement. This suggests that the income tax 
displays the steepest marginal cost curve of the available tax instruments, which – 
being the most mobile tax base – is consistent with the view that extracting revenues 
from mobile tax bases is particularly costly in a competitive environment. 
 Overall, our results are compatible with the idea that local governments set the 
tax mix in order to minimize the political costs of raising revenues, with the latter 
being plausibly and chiefly affected by the economic characteristics of the locality 
(most importantly the size and distribution of tax bases). This occurs irrespective of 
the government’s ideology: taxes entail a political cost, whoever raises them. In 
effect, the lack of evidence of spatial dependence among nearby authorities reinforces 
the idea that policymakers’ tax mix choices are mostly responsive to internal 
economic determinants.  
 The above evidence arguably presents an indirect test of the functioning of the 
political cost minimization mechanism. A more direct test would involve verification 
of the impact on government popularity or electoral outcomes of manoeuvring the 
different ingredients of the available tax mix. While Geys and Vermeir (2008) find 
that such changes in the US tax structure (referred to as ‘tax structure turbulence’) 
affect the popularity of US presidents over and above the total tax burden imposed on 
the population, they do not evaluate the individual effects of different available tax 
mix ingredients. Extending this line of analysis to more directly assess the political 
costs involved in using certain tax sources rather than others and evaluate whether 
similar effects play at the local government level might prove to be a fruitful line of 
future research. 
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Table 1: Tax revenue shares – summary statistics (N=289; period 1995-2002) 
 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Income 44.73 
(11.08) 
44.07 
(10.80) 
44.02 
(10.67) 
44.25 
(10.78) 
44.97 
(10.83) 
45.92 
(11.04) 
45.99 
(11.25) 
45.41 
(10.97) 
Property 39.49 
(8.97) 
39.87 
(8.79) 
40.09 
(8.73) 
40.30 
(8.82) 
39.52 
(9.04) 
39.31 
(9.09) 
38.92 
(8.92) 
39.95 
(8.67) 
Business 2.63 
(4.53) 
2.62 
(4.48) 
2.46 
(4.45) 
2.50 
(4.39) 
2.47 
(4.41) 
2.43 
(4.41) 
2.55 
(4.75) 
2.65 
(4.80) 
Fees 8.39 
(4.82) 
8.73 
(4.90) 
8.47 
(4.79) 
8.33 
(4.64) 
8.10 
(4.49) 
7.91 
(4.41) 
7.82 
(4.44) 
7.45 
(4.39) 
 
Note: Unweighted averages across all municipalities; standard deviation between brackets. 
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Table 2: Reduced form tax revenue share system 
 
 income property business charges other 
Grants 0.008 *** (10.23) 
-0.003 *** 
(4.17) 
-0.001 *** 
(4.05) 
-0.001 *** 
(0.65) 
-0.003 *** 
(3.27) 
Income tax base (,000) 8.330 *** (4.61) 
-3.371 * 
(1.91) 
-1.698 ** 
(1.98) 
-0.435 
(1.60) 
-2.826 
(0.36) 
Property tax base -0.022 *** (7.72) 
0.030 *** 
(10.86) 
-0.004 *** 
(3.14) 
-0.005 ** 
(2.36) 
0.001 
(0.46) 
Business tax base -40.077 *** (3.31) 
0.195   
(0.02) 
27.568 *** 
(4.43) 
5.888 
(0.59) 
6.426 
(0.50) 
Population (,000) -0.049 (0.30) 
0.021   
(0.13) 
-0.150 * 
(1.75) 
0.323 ** 
(2.36) 
-0.144 
(0.81) 
Population density 0.006  (0.77) 
0.022 *** 
(2.78) 
-0.001 
(0.34) 
-0.027 *** 
(4.17) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
Income inequality -0.028 *** (2.62) 
0.015   
(1.43) 
0.009  
(1.56) 
0.003 
(0.33) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
Unemployment -47.570 *** (2.83) 
11.477 
(0.69) 
-4.077 
(0.47) 
4.657 
(0.34) 
35.544 ** 
(2.00) 
Old -22.391 * (1.65) 
56.101 *** 
(4.16) 
-7.430 
(1.06) 
-17.974 
(1.62) 
-8.306 
(0.58) 
Index of fragmentation 
(number of parties) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
0.559 ***  
(3.39) 
-0.199 ** 
(2.34) 
-0.044 
(0.33) 
-0.314 * 
(1.78) 
Index of executive ideology 
(0 (left) to 10 (right) scale) 
-0.018 
(0.10) 
-0.263 
(1.45) 
-0.032 
(0.34) 
-0.173 
(1.16) 
0.487 **     
(2.51) 
Voter turnout 13.803 (0.97) 
-17.604 
(1.24) 
-22.883 *** 
(3.12) 
27.001 ** 
(2.31) 
-0.316 
(0.02) 
Female representation 2.104 *** (3.63) 
1.985 *** 
(3.45) 
-0.863 *** 
(2.89) 
-0.601 
(1.27) 
-2.625 *** 
(4.26) 
Municipality effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Time effects yes yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.18 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.02 
Observations  
(units) 
2312 (289) 2312 (289) 2312 (289) 2312 (289) 2312 (289) 
 
Note: Dependent variable = share of revenues from each tax source; t statistics in parentheses; ***, ** 
and *  significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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Table 3: Scale effect hypothesis 
 
 income property business charges Other 
Grants -0.026 *** (7.72) 
-0.096 *** 
(15.65) 
-0.017 *** 
(7.30) 
-0.022 *** 
(7.80) 
-0.028 *** 
(5.47) 
Municipality effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Time effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Other controls yes yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.78 0.51 0.08 0.07 0.04 
Observations 
(units) 
2312 
(289) 
2312 
(289) 
2312 
(289) 
2312 
(289) 
2312 
(289) 
 
Note:  Dependent variables = (real) per capita revenues in jurisdiction i and year t from each tax base k; t 
statistics in parentheses; ***, ** and *  significant at 1%, 5% and 10%; Controls: population, population 
density, property value, number of firms per inhabitant, income, income inequality, unemployment, % 
old, fragmentation, ideology, turnout, female representation in the executive. 
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Table 4: Moran test on raw tax shares 
 
 income property business charges other 
1995 0.353** 0.316** 0.211** 0.134** 0.081 
1996 0.332** 0.303** 0.193** 0.147** 0.039 
1997 0.334** 0.298** 0.191** 0.139** 0.024 
1998 0.326** 0.300** 0.186** 0.131** 0.033 
1999 0.322** 0.289** 0.189** 0.131** 0.030 
2000 0.336** 0.290** 0.150** 0.132** 0.029 
2001 0.341** 0.272** 0.122** 0.158** 0.047 
2002 0.343** 0.340** 0.149** 0.132** 0.021 
Average 1995-2002 0.351** 0.317** 0.189** 0.155** 0.061 
Observations 289 289 289 289 289 
 
Note: *, ** significant at 5%, 1%.  
 
 
Table 5: Moran test on the residuals from system (1) 
 
 income property business charges other 
1995 0.098* -0.028 -0.096* 0.013 0.008 
1996 -0.007 0.085* -0.071 0.091* -0.103* 
1997 -0.023 -0.027 -0.039 0.042 -0.023 
1998 0.000 -0.039 0.002 -0.034 -0.024 
1999 0.045 0.046 0.027 0.039 -0.025 
2000 0.051 0.060 -0.060 -0.020 0.000 
2001 0.032 0.012 -0.077 0.068 0.019 
2002 -0.038 0.055 -0.070 0.017 0.041 
Average 1995-2002 -0.011 0.049 0.058 0.006 -0.019 
Observations 289 289 289 289 289 
 
Note: *, ** significant at 5%, 1%. 
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Figure 1: Optimal taxation with two tax instruments 
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Table A1: Summary statistics (2312 observations) 
 mean st.dev. min max Variable description 
Own revenues per capita 410.21 132.90 130.28 1286.36 Total revenues from local revenue sources, per capita, in € 
Income tax per capita 
(share of own revenues) 
175.81 
(44.98) 
45.28 
(10.90) 
26.03 
(2.75) 
412.30 
(70.25)  
Property tax per capita 
(share of own revenues) 
168.98 
(39.59) 
97.00 
(8.74) 
31.47 
(12.86) 
986.44 
(76.68)  
Business tax per capita 
(share of own revenues) 
12.39 
(2.54) 
26.04 
(4.53) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
253.32 
(41.76)  
User fees per capita 
(share of own revenues) 
34.29 
(8.18) 
30.09 
(4.60) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
275.46 
(34.98)  
Other revenue per capita 
(share of own revenues) 
18.74 
(4.71) 
20.56 
(4.39) 
1.26 
(0.36) 
429.16 
(52.61)  
Income per capita 10,843 1,524 6,713 16,604 Personal taxable income, per capita, in € 
Property tax base per capita 524.30 223.50 134.60 2038.72 Net assessed rental value of housing property, per capita, in € 
Number of firms per inhabitant 0.11 0.15 0.01 2.05 Number of active firms registered in municipality, per capita 
Population (,000) 19.67 31.53 0.96 459.07 Number of inhabitants (in 1000 individuals) 
 1 
 
 
 
Population density 501.78 424.87 50.22 3223 Number of inhabitants per square kilometre 
Income inequality 70.18 41.49 0 134.8 Ratio of interquartile difference in income to the median value 
Unemployment 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.07 Number of unemployed as share of total population 
Old 0.16 0.02 0.07 0.25 Population over 65 as share of total population 
Fragmentation  1.79 0.73 1 5 Number of coalitions partners 
Ideology  4.98 0.61 2.6 6.1 
Index weighting seat share of each coalition 
party with its ideological stance (measured 
between 0 (left) and 10 (right)) 
Voter turnout 0.94 0.02 0.88 0.98 Number of valid and invalid votes cast as share of eligible population 
Female representation 0.17 0.15 0 0.75 Share of female councillors 
